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Mobile IP Security Considerations (Page 2 of 2) Protecting Against Replay Attacks Another concern is a security problem called a replay attack. In this type of attack, a third party intercepts a datagram, holds onto it and then re-sends it later on. This seems fairly harmless, but consider the importance of timing. Imagine a mobile node registers with its home agent, then later returns home and deregisters. If a malicious device captures a copy of the original Registration Request and re-sends it, the home agent might be fooled into thinking the node has traveled away from home when it has not. It could then intercept the forwarded datagrams. The Identification field used in Registration Request and Registration Reply messages is designed to prevent replay attacks. Since each request has a different Identification number, nodes and agents can match up requests with replies and reject any datagrams they receive that are repeats of ones they have seen already. The Mobile IP standard also specifies alternative methods for protecting against replays. While Mobile IP includes authentication measures for registration messages, it does not for other types of messages. It also doesn't specify authentication of encapsulated datagrams being forwarded from the home agent to the mobile node. Encryption is also not provided to safeguard the privacy of either control messages or forwarded datagrams. The obvious solution when stronger assurances of privacy or authenticity are required is to make use of the IPSec Authentication Header (AH) and/or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocols.
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